

**PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

EXECUTIVE DIVISION

Resolution M-4862  
October 6, 2022

**RESOLUTION**

**RESOLUTION M-4862 ADOPTING ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF THE SAFETY AND ENFORCEMENT DIVISION ISSUED TO PACIFICORP REGARDING 2020 PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF REQUIREMENT VIOLATIONS PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION M-4846.**

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**SUMMARY**

In this Resolution, the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) adopts the proposed Administrative Enforcement Order (AEO) issued by the Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) to PacifiCorp to resolve SED’s investigation into noncompliance with requirements in Resolution ESRB-8, Decision (D.) 19-05-042 and D.20-05-051 arising from PacifiCorp’s 2020 Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS) events. PacifiCorp must take certain corrective actions within 120 days following the adoption of this Resolution to ensure future compliance with the PSPS requirements.

**BACKGROUND**

Resolution ESRB-8, D.19-05-042, and D.20-05-05 direct investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to follow certain requirements in executing a PSPS event. Included in these guidelines is a requirement that IOUs submit to the Commission post-PSPS event reports summarizing the event.

In 2020, PacifiCorp initiated a total of three PSPS events and submitted two post-PSPS event reports to the Commission. Based on the information submitted in these reports, SED released a Post Event Report Review that summarized the findings of those three 2020 PSPS events. SED’s Post Event Report Review found PacifiCorp did not comply with certain reporting requirements under Resolution ESRB-8, D.19-05-042 and D.20-05-051.

Resolution M-4846, issued in November 2020, adopted the Commission Enforcement and Penalty Assessment Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy) and authorized Commission staff to propose an AEO to resolve an enforcement matter, subject to review and approval by the Commission.

SED issued the attached proposed AEO, pursuant to and consistent with the Enforcement Policy, in response to the violations arising from PacifiCorp's reporting of 2020 PSPS events. These violations are summarized in the attached proposed AEO and SED Post Event Report Review.<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to Resolution M-4846, a utility may request a hearing of the proposed AEO within 30 days of the date the proposed AEO is issued. (Enforcement Policy, p. 13.) The proposed AEO was issued on June 15, 2022. PacifiCorp did not file a request for a hearing. Accordingly, pursuant to the Enforcement Policy, the proposed Administrative Enforcement Order shall become final upon review and adoption by the Commission. (Enforcement Policy, p. 13.) The AEO resolves all issues related to SED's investigation into the noncompliance of PacifiCorp's 2020 PSPS events.

### **CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

The AEO proposed PacifiCorp to take certain corrective actions but did not propose payment of a monetary penalty.

The Commission has broad authority to impose penalties on any public utility that "fails or neglects to comply with any part or provision of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission." (Pub. Util. Code § 2107.) The AEO outlines several instances where PacifiCorp did not meet the provisions of Resolution ESRB-8, D.19-05-042, and D.20-05-051 as directed by the Commission. In part, these orders give guidance to IOUs of the type and timing of notifications to customers and public safety partners.

Based on SED's consideration of the violations as explained in the AEO, the violations for which SED cited PacifiCorp include not properly reporting the de-energization event after it occurred and not timely notifying public safety partners. The AEO proposes corrective actions and requires PacifiCorp to explain why the minimum notification timeline was not made to these public safety partners, and to use this information to better inform decisions for future PSPS events.

In considering appropriate remedies, SED noted that while the Commission highlights the importance of advance notification prior to a PSPS, it has also recognized situations where advance notice is impossible due to changing circumstances. Resolution ESRB-8 requires an IOU to notify customers "to the extent feasible and appropriate" (Res. ESRB-8, p. 4), recognizing that "it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advance notification to customer prior to a de-energization event." (Res. ESRB-8, p. 5.) D.19-05-042 acknowledged "there may be times when de-energization must occur with little to no notification in order to respond to an emergency situation, to avoid the risk of a utility-caused wildfire, or because de-energization occurs due to an unforeseen circumstance outside of the control of the utility." (D.19-05-042, pp. 85-86.)

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<sup>1</sup> Distinct from the process detailed in D.22-04-057 and D.22-04-058, this Resolution is the product of Commission advisory staff. Unlike Resolutions SED-5 and SED-6, this Resolution puts forth an un-appealed Administrative Enforcement Order not an Administrative Consent Order. No Administrative Law Judges or Commissioners are involved in the draft of the Resolution.

The Commission does, however, require notification to affected customers in three instances: when de-energization was initiated, when re-energization begins, and once re-energization is completed. These notifications are unambiguous in that they are triggered by an event completely in the control of the utility, the de-energization. SED found that PacifiCorp did send out these required notifications to affected customers when de-energization was initiated during the PSPS events in 2020. SED also found that PacifiCorp's offenses are minor deviations from reporting and public safety partner notification requirements. Therefore, SED does not propose a monetary penalty on PacifiCorp. We agree that SED's imposition of corrective actions without a monetary penalty is appropriate in this instance.

We find that the corrective actions that the AEO requires are reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances to protect the public's interest in promoting the safety, health, comfort and convenience for potentially impacted customers of PSPS events. While the Commission does not impose a monetary penalty in this instance, the Commission will evaluate any potential violations during future PSPS events on a case-by-case basis.

PacifiCorp did not request a hearing, and accordingly shall implement the corrective actions contained in the AEO. We adopt the proposed AEO as final.

#### **COMMENTS ON DRAFT RESOLUTION**

The Draft Resolution was served on PacifiCorp and other interested parties on September 2, 2022 in accordance with Pub. Util. Code § 311(g). Comments were received from:

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#### **FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

1. Resolution M-4846 authorized Commission staff to issue an Administrative Enforcement Order to resolve an enforcement matter, subject to review and approval by the Commission.
2. SED issued the attached proposed AEO and Post Event Report Review dated June 15, 2022 to PacifiCorp.
3. PacifiCorp did not request a hearing within 30 days of the proposed AEO's issuance and accordingly has waived its right to a hearing on the AEO's findings.
4. The corrective action requirements set forth in the attached AEO appropriately resolve all issues related to SED's investigation of PacifiCorp's 2020 PSPS events and any enforcement action arising therefrom.

#### **THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:**

1. The Administrative Enforcement Order issued by the Commission's Safety Enforcement Division to PacifiCorp relating to its 2020 PSPS event violations addressed therein is adopted and final.
2. PacifiCorp shall comply with all requirements specified in the Administrative Enforcement Order issued by SED to PacifiCorp relating to its 2020 PSPS event violations, including the corrective actions set forth in the AEO.

3. Within 120 days following adoption of this Administrative Enforcement Order, PacifiCorp shall submit to the Safety Enforcement Division written certification that it has corrected all violations.

This Resolution is effective today.

I certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission at its regular meeting on October 6, 2022, and the following Commissioners approved favorably thereon:

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RACHEL PETERSON  
Executive Director

# **ATTACHMENTS**

## **Administrative Enforcement Order and 2020 PSPS Annual Review**

**CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

In the matter of:  
  
PacifiCorp’s Execution of 2020  
Public Safety Power Shutoff Events

[PROPOSED] ADMINISTRATIVE  
ENFORCEMENT ORDER

**[PROPOSED] ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORDER**

**YOU ARE GIVEN NOTICE THAT:**

1. PacifiCorp is alleged to have violated Commission Resolution ESRB – 8, Decision D.19-05-042, D.20-05-051
2. The California Public Utilities Commission’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED or Division) issues this proposed Administrative Enforcement Order (Proposed Order) to PacifiCorp (PacifiCorp or Respondent) pursuant to the authority in the Commission Enforcement Policy adopted by Resolution M-4846 (Policy). Pursuant to the Policy, SED is authorized to issue a proposed Administrative Enforcement Order (Proposed Order) to a regulated entity that has violated a Commission order, resolution, decision, general order, or rule. That Proposed Order may include a directive to pay a penalty

**RIGHT TO HEARING**

3. Respondent is required to respond to this Proposed Order by 5:00 p.m. on ***Friday, July 15, 2022***. By way of such response, Respondent, must either: 1) pay any penalty required by this Proposed Order or 2) request a hearing on the Proposed Order. To request a hearing, the Respondent must file a Request for Hearing (including a complete title page complying with Rule 1.6 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure) along with copies of any materials the Respondent wants to provide in support of its request with the Commission’s Docket Office **and** must serve the Request for Hearing, at a minimum, on:
  - 1) The Chief Administrative Law Judge (with an electronic copy to [Administrative\\_Enforcement\\_Appeals\\_Coordinator@cpuc.ca.gov](mailto:Administrative_Enforcement_Appeals_Coordinator@cpuc.ca.gov)).
  - 2) The Director of Safety and Enforcement Division
  - 3) The Executive Director
  - 4) General Counsel
  - 5) The Director of the Public Advocates Office at the California Public Utilities Commission

The right to a hearing is forfeited if a Request for Hearing is not timely filed. If a timely Request for Hearing is not filed, this Proposed Order will become final and effective upon adoption by the Commission (Final Order).

4. Respondent must comply with the corrective action requirements of this Proposed Order by the date specified in the Proposed Order in paragraph 8 below, regardless of whether a Request for Hearing is filed. Neither payment of the penalty assessed in this Proposed Order nor the filing of a timely Request for Hearing shall excuse Respondent from curing the violations identified in this Proposed Order.
5. A requested hearing shall be conducted by an Administrative Law Judge in accordance with the hearing provisions in the Citation Appellate Rules. After hearing, this Proposed Order or any Administrative Law Judge modifications to the Proposed Order shall become a Final Order, effective upon Commission approval of the draft resolution prepared by the Administrative Law Judge. The draft Administrative Law Judge resolution approved by the Commission is subject to rehearing pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 1731 and to judicial review pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 1756.
6. Unless otherwise specified, "days" means calendar days.

## FINDINGS

7. ***Facts:*** Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) have the authority to shut off the electric power to protect public safety under California law. Utilities do this during severe wildfire threat conditions as a preventative measure of last resort through Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). Such power cuts reduce the risk of the IOUs’ infrastructure to cause or contribute to a wildfire. However, a PSPS can leave communities and essential facilities without power, which brings its own risks and hardships, particularly for vulnerable communities and individuals. From 2018 through 2020, the Commission issued three sets of guidelines, namely, Resolution ESRB-8, Decision (D) 19-05-042 and (D) 20-05-051, directing the IOUs to follow these guidelines in PSPS execution. In 2020, PacifiCorp initiated a total of three PSPS events and submitted two post event reports to CPUC. Stakeholders provided comments on these post event reports. SED performed reviews on the submitted reports, including consideration of stakeholder comments, to evaluate PacifiCorp’s compliance with the reporting requirements under Resolution ESRB-8, D19-05-042 and D20-05-051.

**Table 1**

Report #	Report Title	Events Covered
1	September 13 – September 17, 2020	1. Sep. 11 – Sep. 13 2. Sep. 17
2	October 25, 2020	Oct. 25

PacifiCorp did not comply with provisions of Commission Resolution ESRB – 8, Decision (D.) 19-05-042 and D. 20-05-051. Please see attachment “2020 Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Post Event Report Review - PacifiCorp ” for more details.

- A. Resolution ESRB-8 states in part “IOUs shall submit a report to the Director of SED within 10 business days after each de-energization event, as well as after high-threat events where the IOU provided notifications to local government, agencies, and customers of possible de-energization though no de-energization occurred”. (ESRB – 8 at 5)
  - A.1 The PSPS post event report submitted on October 1, 2020 covered two events ending on September 13 and September 17 respectively. PacifiCorp met the 10 business day reporting deadline for the September 17 event. However, PacifiCorp did not meet the 10 day reporting deadline for the September 13 PSPS event. See details below:

**Table 2**

Dates	Event concluded	Report due dates	PacifiCorp’s filing dates	Days overdue
Sep. 11-13	Sep. 13	Sep. 25	Oct. 1	6
Sep. 17	Sep. 17	Oct. 1	Oct. 1	On time

- B. Resolution ESRB-8 states in part “A report to the Director of SED.....that includes..... (iv) the number of affected customers, broken down by residential, medical baseline, commercial/industrial, and other. (vi)a description of the notice to customers and any other mitigation provided...”. (ESRB-8 at 3.)
  - B.1. For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp did not report the number of affected customers, broken down by residential, medical baseline, commercial/industrial, and other. Instead, PacifiCorp’s affected customer breakdown included an undefined category called “medically sensitive”. “Medically sensitive” is not a required category.
- C. D.19-05-042 Appendix A states in part “In addition to submitting a report to the Director of the Commission’s Safety and Enforcement Division within 10 business days of power restoration, electric investor-owned utilities must serve their de-energization report on the service lists of this proceeding and Rulemaking 18-10-007 or their successor proceedings. Service should include a link to the report on the utility’s website and



contact information to submit comments to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division.”” (Appendix A at A22.)

C.1. PacifiCorp did not timely and properly serve the report for the September 13 event. PacifiCorp served the report for two separate events, September 13 and September 17, on October 1, 2020. As the report covered two events, PacifiCorp missed the deadline for September 13 event. See detailed above under B.1.1.

C.2. For both of the submitted reports covering the September 13 – 17 events and the October 25 event, the email to the service list did not include a link to the reports on PacifiCorp’s website nor the contact information to submit comments to the Director of SED.

D. D.19-05-042 Appendix A states in part “the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the decision criteria leading to de-energization, including an evaluation of alternatives to de-energization that were considered and mitigation measures used to decrease the risk of utility-caused wildfire in the de-energized area” (D.19-05-042 at A22- A23).

D.1 For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp stated minimization of the footprint and limiting the PSPS time is the most reasonable alternative available. However, PacifiCorp did not provide the specific alternatives it considered nor the evaluation of the alternatives.

D.2 For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp reported the alternatives included patrols, modification of system protective settings (to non-reclosing) and reducing the footprint of the PSPS impacted area and the event’s duration. Patrols are not PSPS alternatives. PacifiCorp did not provide a robust evaluation of each alternative it considered before calling a PSPS.

E. D.19-05-042 states in part “The electric investor-owned utilities should, whenever possible, adhere to the following minimum notification timeline:”

- 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization: notification of public safety partners/priority notification entities
- 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization: notification of all other affected customers/populations
- 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible: notification of all affected customers/populations
- When de-energization is initiated: notification of all affected customers/populations

- Immediately before re-energization begins: notification of all affected customers/populations
- When re-energization is complete: notification of all affected customers/populations (D.19-05-042 at A8)

E.1. PacifiCorp did not meet the 48-72 hours advance public safety partner notification requirement for the following two events.

Table 3

Event	Initial notifications sent	Planned de-energization time	Approximate hours in advance	Number of affected public safety officials, critical customers
Sep. 11 – Sep. 13	1:30 p.m., Sep. 11	10am, Sep. 13	45 hours	26
Oct. 25	5:30 p.m., Oct. 23	7am, Oct. 25	38	28

Note: Oct. 25 event did not de-energize any customers.

- F. D.19-05-042 states in part “the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the following information: 2) a copy of all notifications, the timing of notifications,...; (Appendix A, at A22-A23).
- F.1 PacifiCorp did not provide copies of the notifications sent to public safety partners nor the notification scripts per the guideline requirement. Without this information, SED cannot determine whether the notifications to public safety partners include the estimated power shutoff time, event duration, estimated time of restoration or the number of medical based line customers in the impacted areas.
- G. D19-05-042 states in part “the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the following information: 3) if the utility fails to provide advanced notification or notification according to the minimum timelines set forth in these Guidelines, an explanation of the circumstances that resulted in such failure. (Appendix A, at A22-A23)
- G.1 As pointed out in E.1 above, PacifiCorp failed to provide 48-72 hours advance notification to its public safety partner for two

events. PacifiCorp did not provide an explanation of the circumstances that resulted in such failure.

- H. D.19-05-042 states in part “the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the following information: 4) A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced education and outreach and notification during the de-energization event; (Appendix A, at A22-A23)
  - H.1 PacifiCorp only reported its engagement with public safety partners on notifications but did not report the advanced education and outreach engagement.
  - H.2 PacifiCorp did not provide an evaluation of its engagement with local and state public safety partners.
  
- I. D.19-05-042 states in part “the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the following information: 5) For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, an accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved;” (Appendix A, at A22-A23)
  - I.1. For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp only reported it notified medically sensitive customers, however, it did not disclose the number of notification attempts made and the number of successful positive notification was achieved. In addition, PacifiCorp did not clearly state under which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation medically sensitive customers were included.
  - I.2. For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp provided statistics on the positive notification of non-critical customers. However, PacifiCorp did not clearly state under which the tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation non-critical customers were included.
  
- J. D.20-05-051, Appendix A (c) states in part “Each electric investor-owned utility shall enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications in its post event reports by citing the sources of changing data” (Appendix A, page 4)
  - J.1. For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp did not enumerate nor explain the cause of false communications in the report. For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp reported the number

of positive notifications and number of unsuccessful notifications in satisfying this guideline requirement. Inaccurate communications are false communications. Unsuccessful notifications are not false communications.

K. D.20-05-051, Appendix A (h) states in part “These reports shall include a thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event (including information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort option) and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (Appendix A, page 9)

K.1. For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp provided a table, comparing the predetermined threshold with forecast value and with the actual value for the quantitative attributes in the PSPS decision-making process. PacifiCorp failed to provide a similar comparison table for the September 13 – September 17 events.

## **PENALTIES**

8. The Commission has broad authority to impose penalties on any public utility that “fails or neglects to comply with any part or provision of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction, demand, or requirement of the commission.” (PU Code § 2106). We outlined several instances in this Order where PacifiCorp did not meet the provisions of Resolution ESRB-8, D.19-05-042, and D.20-05-051 as directed by the Commission. In part, these orders give guidance to IOUs of the type and timing of notifications to customers and public safety partners.

However, we are mindful that the Commission also gave IOUs discretion in several areas given the dynamic nature of these events. This is especially true of advance notifications prior to a de-energization event. While the Commission highlights the importance of advance notification prior to a PSPS, it also recognized situations where advance notice is impossible due to changing circumstances. Resolution ESRB-8 requires IOU to notify customers “to the extent feasible and appropriate” (p. 4), recognizing that “it is not practicable to have an absolute requirement that electric IOUs provide advance notification to customer prior to a de-energization event.” (p. 5). D.19-05-042 expanded somewhat on advance notifications to customers but again acknowledged “there may be times when de-energization must occur with little to no notification in order to respond to an emergency situation, to avoid the risk of a utility-caused wildfire, or because de-energization occurs due to an unforeseen circumstance outside of the control of the utility.” (pp. 85-86).

D.19-05-042 requires IOUs to provide advance notifications 48-72 hours in advance of an anticipated de-energization, 24-48 hours in advance, and 1-4 hours in advance “whenever possible”. (p. 86-87). It further recognizes that advanced notification

1-4 hours before an anticipate de-energization event “may not be possible at this juncture.” (p. 87, fn. 93).

This Order and the accompanying report lay out instances where PacifiCorp did not adhere to the notification timeline to certain public safety partners as required by the Commission. They are required to explain why the minimum notification timeline was not made to these public safety partners. They should use this information to better inform decisions for future PSPS events.

With that, the Commission does not extend deference to utilities in three instances of required notification to affected customers; when de-energization was initiated, when re-energization begins, and once re-energization is completed. These notifications are unambiguous in that they are triggered by an event completely in the control of the utility, the de-energization. During the PSPS events in 2020, PacifiCorp has sent out these notifications to affected customers when de-energization was initiated. Therefore, SED does not impose a fine on PacifiCorp.

### **CORRECTIVE ACTION**

9. Respondent shall conduct the following actions in the manner specified herein, and in accordance with a schedule specified by the Division as follows:
  - 1) PacifiCorp must file and submit the PSPS post event report in compliance with the requirements under Resolution ESRB-8 and D19-05-042, including timely and properly submission and service of each post event report that covers each individual PSPS event.
  - 2) PacifiCorp must report the breakdown of affected customers by the required categories.
  - 3) PacifiCorp must provide more specific alternatives and evaluation of each alternative it considers before calling a PSPS.
  - 4) PacifiCorp must follow the requirements under D19-05-042 including timeline and notification content when sending notifications to public safety partners. For any deviation from the minimum timeline sets forth in the guidelines, PacifiCorp must provide an explanation of the circumstances that resulted in such failure.
  - 5) PacifiCorp must report the engagement with local and state public safety partners not only on notifications, but also on the advanced education and outreach engagement. In addition, PacifiCorp must provide the evaluation of such engagement for each event.
  - 6) For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, PacifiCorp must consistently disclose the number of notification attempts made and the number of successful positive notification achieved as well as which tariff designation of the positive notification customers were.
  - 7) PacifiCorp must enumerate and explain the cause of situations at-issue, which involves some level of perceived defect in notice, including but not limited to, when customers were de-energized without any advance notifications and when customers are notified for de-energization, but end up with no power shut off.

- 8) PacifiCorp must consistently provide the through and detailed quantitative information about the decision criteria, compare the forecasted weather parameters and the actual value in the PSPS decision-making process for all the events.
10. Within 120 days following adoption of this Order by the Commission (Final Order), Respondent shall submit to the Division written certification that it has corrected all violations. The certification shall include confirmation of its compliance (accompanied by all supporting documentation) or noncompliance with all requirements set forth in Paragraph 8. Any notice of noncompliance required under this paragraph shall state the reasons for noncompliance and when compliance is expected and shall include a detailed plan for bringing the Respondent into compliance. Notice of noncompliance shall in no way excuse the noncompliance.
11. Respondent shall be subject to a penalty amount for each failure to comply with the actions required by Paragraph 8. The penalty amount shall be within the range allowed by statute and calculated in accordance with the Commission's Penalty Assessment Methodology, attached as Appendix I to the Policy.
12. All written submittals from Respondent pursuant to this Order shall be sent to:

Division Director Lee Palmer  
Safety Enforcement Division  
California Public Utilities Commission  
505 Van Ness Avenue  
San Francisco, CA 94102

All other communications from Respondent pursuant to this Order shall be to:

Anthony Noll, Program Manager, Anthony.Noll@cpuc.ca.gov, (916) 247-9372.

13. All approvals and decisions of the Division will be communicated to Respondent in writing by the Division Director or a designee. No informal advice, guidance, suggestions, or comments by the Division regarding reports, plans, specifications, schedules or any other writings by Respondent shall be construed to relieve Respondent of the obligation to obtain such formal approvals as may be required or to bind the Commission.
14. If the Division determines that any report, plan, schedule, or other document submitted for approval pursuant to the Proposed or Final Order (Order) fails to comply with the Order, the Division may:
  - (a) Return the document to Respondent with recommended changes and a date by which Respondent must submit to the Division a revised document incorporating the recommended changes.

15. Respondent shall carry out this Order in compliance with all local, State, and federal requirements, including but not limited to requirements to obtain permits and to assure worker safety.
16. If Respondent is unable to perform any activity or submit any document within the time required under this Order, Respondent may, prior to expiration of time, request an extension of time in writing. The extension request shall include a justification for the delay and a detailed plan for meeting any new proposed compliance schedule. All such requests shall be in advance of the date on which the activity or document is due.
17. If the Division determines that good cause exists for an extension, it will grant the request and specify in writing a new compliance schedule. Respondent shall comply with the new schedule.
18. All plans, schedules, and reports that require the Division approval and are submitted by Respondent pursuant to this Order are incorporated into this Order upon approval by the Division.
19. Neither the State of California, nor its employees, agents, agencies (including the Commission), representatives, or contractors, shall be liable for injuries or damages to persons or property resulting from acts or omissions by Respondent or related parties in carrying out activities pursuant to this Order, nor shall the Commission be held as a party to a contract entered into by Respondent or its agents in carrying out activities pursuant to this Order.
20. A Final Order shall apply to and be binding upon Respondent, and its officers, directors, agents, employees, contractors, consultants, receivers, trustees, successors, and assignees, including but not limited to individuals, partners, and subsidiary and parent corporations. Respondent shall provide a copy of this Final Order to all contractors, subcontractors, laboratories, and consultants that are retained to conduct any work or activities performed under this Final Order, within 15 days after the effective date of this Final Order or the date of retaining their services, whichever is later. Respondent shall condition any such contracts upon satisfactory compliance with this Final Order. Notwithstanding the terms of any contract, Respondent is responsible for compliance with this Order and for ensuring that its subsidiaries, employees, contractors, consultants, subcontractors, agents, and attorneys comply with this Order.
21. Nothing in this Order shall relieve Respondent from complying with all other applicable laws and regulations. Respondent shall conform all actions required by this Order with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.
22. This is an action to enforce the laws and regulations administered by the Commission. The method of compliance with this enforcement action consists of payment of an administrative penalty and compliance actions to enforce a permit or

order issued by the Commission. The Commission finds that issuance of this Order is exempt from the provisions of the California Environmental Quality Act (Public Resources Code § 2100 et seq.) pursuant to section 15321(a)(2); chapter 3, title 14 of the California Code of Regulations exempting actions to enforce or a permit prescribed by a regulatory agency.

- 23. The Respondent shall not have any ex parte communications with Commission decisionmakers and will only communicate with the Commission through Request for Hearings or other appropriate procedural avenues.

IT IS ORDERED.

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

BY: \_\_\_\_\_

**Leslie L  
Palmer**

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Palmer  
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*Leslie Palmer  
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division  
California Public Utilities Commission*



**2020 Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Post Event Report Review**  
**PacifiCorp**

**Introduction and Recommendations:**

In 2020, PacifiCorp initiated a total of three PSPS events. In one case, PacifiCorp combined two events into a single post event report. As a result, PacifiCorp submitted two post event reports to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The CPUC’s Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) reviewed the submitted reports to evaluate PacifiCorp’s compliance with the reporting requirements under Resolution ESRB-8, Decision 19-05-042 and Decision 20-05-051. The findings in this Post Event Report Review are based on the information presented in the post event reports and the public comments.

**Table 1 - PacifiCorp PSPS Summary**

Report #	Dates	Total Customers Notified	Total Customers De-energized	Medical Baseline Customers De-energized	Number of Counties De-energized	Number of Tribes De-energized
1	Sep. 13-17	3,159	2,559	6	1	0
2	Oct. 25	848	0	0	0	0

*data source: PacifiCorp 2020 PSPS post event reports and PacifiCorp’s responses to SED’s data requests.*

SED has found several issues and concerns and recommends that PacifiCorp take immediate corrective actions to comply with the guideline requirements.

**Compliance Review:**

The results of the review are presented below in the order the existing guidelines were published.

**I. ESRB – 8 Requirements:**

1. *A notification to the Director of SED provided no later than 12 hours after the power shut-off.*

For the September 13, 2020, de-energization event, PacifiCorp notified SED within 12 hours after the power shut-off. For the September 17, 2020 and October 25, 2020 events, no customers were de-energized and no notifications were needed.

2. *IOUs shall submit a report to the Director of SED within 10 business days after each de-energization event, as well as after high-threat events where the IOU provided notifications to local government, agencies, and customers of possible de-energization though no de-energization occurred.*

The PSPS post event report was submitted on October 1, 2020 and covered two events that ended on September 13 and September 17, respectively, and submitted the October 25, 2020 post event report on November 6, 2020. PacifiCorp met the reporting deadline of 10 business days on the September 17 and October 25 events. However, PacifiCorp did not meet the 10 days reporting deadline on the September 13 PSPS event. See details below:

**Table 2**

Dates	Event concluded	Report due dates	PacifiCorp's filing dates	Days overdue
Sep. 11-13	Sep. 13	Sep. 25	Oct. 1	6
Sep. 17	Sep. 17	Oct. 1	Oct. 1	On Time
Oct. 25	Oct. 25	Nov. 6	Nov. 6	On Time

3. *90The report should include:*

- a. *an explanation of the decision to shut off power;*

PacifiCorp explained its decision making process, as summarized below:

Based on weather forecast, PacifiCorp assessed whether the threshold values were to be exceeded. If the exceedance occurred and the coincidence warranted further advancement of a possible PSPS, PacifiCorp then reviewed current fire suppression and public safety partner resources and incorporated those into its decision-making process. To the extent that micro-sectionalization could occur, further time and place details were prepared including switching plans.

For SED's evaluation, see Section II. 2. a. (evaluation of | D.19-05-042 – Phase I Guidelines).

- b. *all factors considered in the decision to shut off power, including wind speed, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits;*

PacifiCorp reported that it considered the following factors:

- Keetch Byram Drought Index (fuel moisture)
- Fosberg Fire Weather Index: averaged over 6 hours (temp/humidity)
- Wind gusts
- Vapor pressure deficit (recent drying)
- Red flag warnings
- Availability of fire suppression resources
- Input received about need for electric supply to support key public safety partner locations
- Observer input regarding weather impacts to electrical equipment and positioned at key risk locations
- Inputs regarding any observed precipitation (or other meteorological input) that could indicate limits to spread risks

For SED’s evaluation, see Section II. 2. a. (evaluation of D.19-05-042 – Phase I Guidelines).

*c. the time, place, and duration of the shut-off event;*

PacifiCorp provided the time, place, and duration of the only shut-off event that ended with a power shutoff.

*d. the number of affected customers, broken down by residential, medical baseline, commercial/industrial, and other;*

In the report on the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp’s breakdown of affected customers included a category called “medically sensitive,” “Medically sensitive” is not a required category. PacifiCorp must clearly report the number of affected customers by the required category.

*e. any wind-related damage to IOU’s overhead power-line facilities in the areas where power is shut off;*

PacifiCorp reported there was no equipment damage.

*f. a description of the notice to customers and any other mitigation provided by IOU;*

PacifiCorp reported it notified customers via individual phone calls, automated outbound calls, emails, and text messages, followed by updates to the company website and a media release.

For SED's evaluation of PacifiCorp's notification practice, see Section II. 2. b and Section II. 2. c. (evaluation of D.19-05-042 – Phase I Guidelines).

PacifiCorp described the patrolling process and vegetation inspection as mitigation measures to decrease fire risk. Given the location and speed of forecasted wind gusts on September 13, in addition to the recent fires in the area, PacifiCorp decided not to micro-sectionalize the two circuits located in the Weed PSPS area during the September 13 event.

- g. any other matters that IOU believes are relevant to the Commission's assessment of the reasonableness of IOU's decision to shut off power.*

PacifiCorp did not report any other matters.

- h. The local communities' representatives the IOU contacted prior to de-energization, the date on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in General Order 95, Rule 21.2-D.*

PacifiCorp provided a list of local communities' representatives it contacted prior to the de-energization including the date of contact. The areas affected were classified as Tier 2 or Tier 3.

- i. If an IOU is not able to provide customers with notice at least 2 hours prior to the de-energization event, the IOU shall provide an explanation in its report.*

For SED's evaluation of PacifiCorp's notification practice, see Section II. 2. b. and Section II. 2. c. (evaluation of D.19-05-042 – Phase I Guidelines).

- j. The IOU shall summarize the number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and include claims that are filed against the IOU because of de-energization.*

PacifiCorp reported it did not receive any customer complaints or claims related to these events.

- k. *The IOU shall provide detailed description of the steps it took to restore power.*

PacifiCorp reported that “[u]pon wind abatement, section by section patrols were undertaken, generally working from the substation out to the next sectionalizing device (be it line fuse, switch, recloser or jumper). When the patrols for that section were completed and confirmed, switching operations took place energizing that patrolled section. This process was conducted in parallel with multiple field teams to ensure rapid restoration of all segments. Thereafter, reclosers and substation relays were put back into normal protective settings modes.”

- l. *The IOU shall identify the address of each community assistance location during a de-energization event, describe the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), describe the assistance available at each location, and give the days and hours that it was open.*

PacifiCorp stated that it did not activate its Community Resource Centers for any of the PSPS events, including the only de-energized September 13 event. PacifiCorp reported that the decision to not active the Community Resource Centers for the September 13 event was due to the short duration of the power shutoff, which was from 10:01am to 5:50 pm, and because it had been informed that the Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) made alternate arrangements for the 70 evacuees from Happy Camp in the area.

4. *The IOU shall notify the Director of SED, as soon as practicable, once it decides to de-energize its facilities. If the notification was not prior to the de-energization event, the IOU shall explain why a pre-event notification was not possible. The notification shall include the area affected, an estimate of the number of customers affected, and an estimated restoration time. The IOU shall also notify the Director of SED of full restoration within 12 hours from the time the last service is restored.*

PacifiCorp properly and timely notified the Director of SED. The notifications included the location, estimated number of customers affected, estimated starting time and end time, and estimated restoration time. PacifiCorp notified the Director of SED within 12 hours after power was fully restored.

## II. D.19-05-042 (R.18-12-005 - Phase 1 Guidelines)

1. *In addition to submitting a report to the Director of the Commission’s Safety*

*and Enforcement Division within 10 business days of power restoration, electric investor-owned utilities must serve their de-energization report on the service lists of this proceeding and Rulemaking 18-10-007 or their successor proceedings. Service should include a link to the report on the utility's website and contact information to submit comments to the Director of the Safety and Enforcement Division.*

PacifiCorp did not timely and properly serve the report for the September 13 – September 17 PSPS events. PacifiCorp served a report covering both events on October 1, 2020. Thus, PacifiCorp missed the deadline for the September 13 event. See details under Section I. 2. In addition, for both of the submitted reports covering September 13 -17 events and October 25 event, the emails to the service list did not include a link to the reports on PacifiCorp's website nor the contact information to submit comments to the Director of SED.

2. In addition to the reporting requirements in Resolution ESRB-8, the electric investor-owned utilities must provide the following information:
  - a. *Decision criteria leading to de-energization, including an evaluation of alternatives to de-energization that were considered and mitigation measures used to decrease the risk of utility-caused wildfire in the de-energized area*

PacifiCorp reported it utilizes quantitative and qualitative data to determine whether it is appropriate to employ PSPS. Inputs included: 1) long-term drying (which would prime the fuel to be highly favorable to fire spread), using Keetch Byram Drought Index (KBDI), 2) fire weather conditions, using a 6 hour Fosberg Fire Weather Index (FFWI6), and 3) winds exceeding sustained or gust threshold levels. Key threshold values for these inputs are:

- Keetch Byram Drought Index in excess of threshold value: 622.2
- Fosberg Fire Weather Index (averaged over 6 hours) in excess of threshold value: 30
- Wind gusts in excess of threshold value: 31 mph
- Vapor pressure deficit at or above 97% historical fire season levels

SED found the following issues:

- 1) For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp did not provide the specific alternatives it considered nor the evaluation of the alternatives. Instead, PacifiCorp only stated that as fire weather metrics materialized, there were limited alternatives to PSPS. PacifiCorp further stated that minimization of the footprint and limiting the PSPS time was the most reasonable alternative available to limit community risks concurrent with limiting fire risk.
- 2) For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp reported the alternatives included patrols, modification of system protective settings (to non-reclosing) and reducing the footprint of the PSPS impacted area and the event’s duration. However, PacifiCorp did not evaluate each of the alternatives and how it applied in the decision-making process. .

- b. *A copy of all notifications, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners).*

Upon the review of the notification description and the communication details, SED found the following deficiencies:

- 1) PacifiCorp did not meet the 48-72 hours advance public safety partner notification requirement for all the events. For the report on the September. 13 – 17 events, a total of 26 public safety partners, critical facilities and medically sensitive customers received delayed notifications. (p.47). For the October 25 event, a total of 28 public safety officials and critical customers received delayed notifications. (p.15-16)
- 2) PacifiCorp did not provide the public safety partner notification scripts. SED can not determine whether the notifications to public safety partners include the estimated power shutoff time, event duration, estimated time of restoration or the number of medical based line customers in the impacted areas.

- c. *If the utility fails to provide advanced notification or notification according to the minimum timelines set forth in these Guidelines, an explanation of the circumstances that resulted in such failure;*

PacifiCorp did not provide an explanation for the deviations from the

requirement as noted in section b above. PacifiCorp must provide its failures to provide notification and the related explanations in the post event report.

- d. *A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced education and outreach and notification during the de-energization event;*

SED finds the following deficiencies:

- 1) PacifiCorp referred to its notification efforts to public safety partners and critical facilities as the responses to this requirement. Notification is only part of the IOU's engagement with local and state public safety partners. PacifiCorp must report the advanced education and outreach engagement.
- 2) PacifiCorp did not provide an evaluation its the engagement with local and state public safety partners.

- e. *For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, an accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved;*

SED noted the following issues:

- 3) For the September 13 – September 17 events, PacifiCorp only reported it notified medically sensitive customer, however, it did not disclose the number of notification attempts made and the number of successful notifications. In addition, PacifiCorp did not clearly state under which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation the medically sensitive customers were included.
- 4) For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp provided statistics on positive notifications to non-critical customers. However, PacifiCorp did not clearly state under which tariff and/or access and functional needs population designation the non-critical customers were included.

- f. *A description of how sectionalization, i.e. separating loads within a circuit, was considered and implemented and the extent to which it impacted the size and scope of the de-energization event;*

PacifiCorp decided not to micro-sectionalize the two circuits located in the



Weed PSPS area due to the speed of forecasted wind gust for the September 13 event.

During the September 17 event and the October 25 event , micro-sectionalization was considered by PacifiCorp to limit the impact of potential de-energization although no customers were de-energized.

- g. *An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks;*

Only the September 13 event resulted in actual de-energization. PacifiCorp stated that it “was concerned that weather and climatic conditions posed a risk of ignition that would quickly be spread beyond control, particularly due to the depletion of local fire suppression resources that were currently supporting fire response efforts elsewhere. During this time in northern California a number of fires were being fought, while in Oregon extremely large fires were being fought. Local public safety partners expressed concern for their ability to lend rapid support, should ignition occur. Communication with these partners, in addition to feedback provided by Cal OES, CalFIRE and community leaders indicated limited local safety risks, once relocation of Slater Fire evacuees was accommodated. PacifiCorp is cognizant of the stresses that de-energization imposes on communities and does not take the action to de-energize lightly. It uses the best information it has available and weighs the consequences of ignition against impacts of de-energization to ensure it is properly serving its customers and communities.”

- h. *The timeline for power restoration (re-energization,) in addition to the steps taken to restore power as required in Resolution ESRB-8;*

For the only event where was de-energization, September 13, power was restored at 5:50 pm on the same day of shut off.

- i. *Lessons learned from the de-energization event;*

PacifiCorp reported the following lessons from its PSPS events.

- PacifiCorp needs to be more familiar with certain notification protocols that have been set up by other utilities and their public safety partners.
- PacifiCorp has identified the need for streamlining the records regarding outbound notifications.

- PacifiCorp is continuing to develop and update processes around notification and documentation of events, in an effort to create and increase cohesive communication and documentation between various departments involved in PSPS events.
  - Based on feedback from prior PSPS events, PacifiCorp learned that access to GIS data through shape files was not easily available. During the October 25 event, PacifiCorp advised its public safety partners of the opportunity and provided such files upon request
- j. *Any recommended updates to the guidelines adopted in Resolution ESRB-8 and this decision.*

PacifiCorp had no recommendations related to the guideline at this time.

### **III. R.18-12-005 Phase 2 Guidelines**

1. *CRCs shall be operable at least 8 AM-10 PM during an active de-energization event, with actual hours of operation to be determined by the local government in cases in which early closure of a facility is required due to inability to access a facility until 10 PM.*

N/A. PacifiCorp did not open a CRC during the only de-energized event on September 13. See detail in Section I.3.1.

2. *Each electric investor-owned utility shall ensure that electric service to impacted service points is restored as soon as possible and within 24 hours from the termination of the de-energization event, unless it is unsafe to do so.*

PacifiCorp was able to restore each impacted circuit within 24 hours from the conclusion of the event.

3. *Each electric investor-owned utility shall enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications in its post event reports by citing the sources of changing data.*

For the September 13-17 events, PacifiCorp did not enumerate nor explain the cause of any false communications in the report. For the October 25 event which ended up no power shutoff, PacifiCorp reported the number of positive notifications and number of unsuccessful notifications in satisfying this guideline requirement. Inaccurate communications are false communications. Unsuccessful notifications are not false communications

4. *Each electric investor-owned utility shall report on all potential or active de-energization events in its post event reports. These reports shall include a thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event (including information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort option) and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event.*

For the October 25 event, PacifiCorp provided a table, comparing the predetermined threshold with forecast value and with the actual value for the quantitative attributes in the PSPS decision-making process. However, PacifiCorp did not provide a similar comparison table for the September 13-17 report.